INTRODUCTION
This paper details management accounting control system (MACS) transformations in an African mining company and tests whether the Hopper et al., (2009) framework, based partly on Burawoy's (1979 Burawoy's ( , 1985 2 delineation of 'factory regimes', on management accounting control system (MACS) evolution in ex-colonial less developed countries (LDCs) is applicable.
Studying the historical evolution of MACSs is not new. Management accounting researchers pursuing a political economy approach have traced changing regimes in the USA and UK (Hopper and Armstrong, 1991; Bryer, 2005; Toms, 2005) . This is pertinent to LDCs but needs modifying to incorporate different socio-political factors. Throughout, accounting has been integral to development policies, often instigated at the behest of transnational institutions (Hopper et al., 2012) . For example, the World Bank (WB) and IMF's structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) were underpinned by beliefs that privatisation and deregulation will produce controls that enhance efficiency and ultimately broader development goals.
Given how socio-political and socio-economic circumstances in ex-colonies bear on MACS transformations, a linear, deterministic analysis is inappropriate. In the 2 Burawoy (1985) offers a coherent analysis of production, management controls and state politics based on research on mines in Zambia, which shares with Ghana a legacy of British colonialism. He criticises economists and sociologists for neglecting LDCs -'the hidden abode of production' -and, when they do, their over-emphasis on market relations and neglect of labour processes, class struggles, and state politics.
factors in the theoretical framework. The final section summarises the conclusions from the iteration of the model with the empirics and details areas where the Hopper et al.
framework needs extension and refinement.
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING CHANGE: A HISTORICAL EVOLUTION
[Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 near here] Hopper et al. (2009) acknowledge the contribution of Chandler (1977) to understanding how MACSs, especially budgets and divisionalisation, enabled large commercial organisations to be controlled but, as he acknowledged, this neglected control of labour processes prominent in labour histories (Gordon et al.1982; Montgomery,1987) . Hopper and Armstrong (1991) incorporated the latter when tracing the evolution of MACSs in USA factories from when subcontracting was dominant to the emergence of large-scale multi-divisional firms. Their dialectal non-deterministic approach incorporates struggles over the labour process (regarding distribution and securing effort) and how
MACSs are not merely determined by markets but also by political programmes of the state. Hopper et al. (2009) modified this approach to trace factors bearing on accounting transformations in LDCs, including those in 'British' West Africa 4 where MACS research is sparse (Goddard, 2010; and Rahaman, 2010) but growing (Andrews, 2013; Hopper et al., 2012; Tauringana and Mangena, 2012) . Their model appeared relevant as its delineation of 'ideal' and 'actual' factory regimes captures factors noted in prior accounting research and African studies (e.g. Hart, 1982; Hopkins, 1976) , i.e. it sees accounting as a product of the interplay of politics, culture, state actions, bureaucracy, and MOPs. Also, the framework is holistic and longitudinal -unlike many accounting studies in Africa (Josiah et al. 2010 );
and it spans complex but interrelated factors in a dialectical and contingent analysis. Hopper et al. (2009) identified three historical epochs -colonial despotism, state capitalism and market capitalism. Each has a different mode of production (MOP), with 4 The paper concentrates on ex-British West African colonies and excludes French ones as colonialism took different forms in each. France got more land but less trade and integrated their governance into that of France whereas Britain largely left local indigenous governance intact and had a small colonial state that collected taxes from the local populace and concentrated on facilitating the trade of resident largely British owned corporations.
remnants of previous cultures lagging onto new MOPs, thus creating complications (Uddin and Hopper, 2003) . State and market capitalism are 'idealised' regimes of control, i.e.
dominant ideologies underpinning socio-economic reforms commended mainly by external agencies. In contrast, colonial despotism, and politicised state and market capitalisms represent actual outcomes (see Figure 1) . Each comes about through force, manipulation, persuasion and authority, within political and economic struggles nationally and within production. Controls, reflecting prevailing managerial strategies of control, veer between coercion and consent following interactions between key factors -the MOP;
culture, ethnicity and race; the state; regulation and the law; political parties; industrial relations; and international finance. Contradictions and conflicts fuel struggles which render each epoch unstable and lay the basis for new regimes.
Prior to colonialism West Africa used slavery; agricultural and commodity production was labour intensive; and governance was often tribal, village-based, warlike, and relied on reciprocity and redistribution, with patrimonial authority based on kinship, age and seniority. Politics were marked by ethnic and religious divisions between warring kingdoms.
Subsequent colonial rule is labelled despotic for force prevailed over consent. One racial group dominated by exercising political, legal and economic rights denied to others.
The British colonial state was rudimentary and largely left traditional non-capitalist MOPs and governance intact -its primary concern was to support foreign capitalist enterprises within primary commodity sectors. The colonial and company states employed ethnic divide and rule tactics to weaken domestic resistance and create subservient indigenous rulers. State regulation was minimal: company states could control employees, largely from rural areas and surrounding communities. The arbitrary power of the colonial boss (usually white) to exercise coercive controls based on physical and financial penalties, racism, and exploitation of ethnic differences often organized production (Spearpoint, 1937 (World Bank, 1993 , 1995a , 1996 Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1995) ; and competition would induce better financial and managerial practices and governance (Adam et al., 1992; Hanke, 1986; Rees, 1985; Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972) . Politicians were in a quandary: to go down this avenue would impair benefits of office; not doing so would diminish external sources of finance upon which they relied. and budgets became ignored or used to exert top-down coercive despotic control.
Externally imposed reforms often disappointed (Fyson, 2009 ).
RESEARCH METHODS
The case study of AGC focussed on its MACSs but also industrial relations, incentive schemes, production and marketing strategies, and organisation structures. The initial contact was with the Financial Controller of the Obuasi Mine in March 1999 who, together with the Group Management Accountant at the head office, helped identify suitable interviewees and gathering of documentary evidence. The study had five stages.
The first, at the head office in Accra, identified, inter alia, head office influence over the mines and corporate policies. The Group's management accountant, human resource manager, assistant company secretary, and the treasury manager participated in informal, semi-structured interviews lasting approximately two hours aimed at understanding company strategy and head office controls. Questions covered changes in ownership, organisation structures, strategies, planning, decision-making, controls including MACSs, human resources and recruitment; and political and economic influences upon operations.
The second stage was in the Obuasi Mine, the original and oldest mine of the group and its largest division having 80% of group employees and most of its production.
Interviews lasting approximately two hours took place with managers at diverse levels to The data was initially analysed by preparing tables listing issues frequently raised in interviews (Potter and Wetherell, 1995; Yin, 2008 (Dumett, 1998) .
The owners continued labour intensive mining but insufficient resources for large-scale mechanised mining within a capitalist MOP induced them in 1895 to sell their interest to a British firm, Ashanti Goldfields Corporation (AGC). We know little about accounting in the mines in this period.
Colonial Despotic Controls
AGC quickly monopolised mining by persuading the chiefs to transfer concessions to them and the Colonial Administration ratified this (Dumett, 1998) . The expansion of operations owed much to major British investments in railway and harbours and their defeat and annexation of the Ashanti kingdom (Dumett, 1998) . Colonialism brought 'colonial despotism' (Burawoy, 1985) . AGC did not employ formal controls, including MACSs, to control labour. Coercion, not consent, prevailed, "...floggings, beatings, cuffs about the head and body, not to mention verbal abuse, were administered as a matter of course for "slow work", tardiness, malingering, or failure to carry out assigned tasks" (Dumett, 1998: 180) . Miners offered little resistance to the harsh capitalist MOP, partly because they lacked organised labour unions, which were illegal (Crisp, 1984) . The colonial state tolerated a local company state that exercised despotic controls to maximise surpluses and regulate labour processes, as in Zambia (Burawoy, 1985) . It rarely intervened, and ignored the harsh treatment of African miners and their deplorable living conditions (Silver, 1978) .
Although formal MACSs were not used during early colonialism, accounting was not absent. Dummett (1988: 509) (Dumett, 1988) . Moreover, accounting reports enabled head office in London to control remittances and compute dividends, which had consequences, for example, in the early 1900s shareholders recommended a major management restructuring following low dividends (AGC, 1897 (AGC, -1934 . Nevertheless, from 1898 to 1939 AGC grew steadily and consistently yielded significant dividends (Taylor, 2006) From inception, miners were recruited from rural areas, predominately from the Christian South. Adapting to a capitalist MOP created problems. Miners perceived the tight physical targets and working conditions as inhumane and their indigenous cultural values received scant attention. Miners' families remained in their villages, which compounded problems. As a manager noted, "Most miners felt very lonely … because that was the first time they had left their family. In fact, for most this was the first time they had travelled outside the community. It was a long time before they were able to come and take the family to join them."
Despite no recognised trade unions, miners started to resist by refusing to work for low pay or sign six and nine month contracts tying them to one company, or perform tasks like going underground (Crisp, 1984) . Reduced wages and the introduction of full-day Saturday shifts brought a strike in 1905. To counter this, the mine's British management forcefully recruited miners, especially for underground jobs, from the predominantly Moslem North. They were also cheaper (Ayensu, 1997). Now Southerners filled supervisory positions, which precipitated ethnic conflicts that still persist. Despite Financial Time's reports of coercive recruitment in 1922, the colonial administration in Accra colluded. It informed its political officers that, "Strict orders have arrived from His Excellency the Governor that 1,000 labourers are to reach the mines by Christmas at least … Do your utmost to get them down on time" (Crisp, 1984: 47) . However, miners' resistance continued (Crisp, 1984) and, as in Zambia, workers' strikes in Ghanaian mines, including AGC, forced the colonial state to require companies to create a rudimentary internal state to govern industrial relations. However, this did not eradicate despotic controls or racial employment policies.
Initially, the state used tribal structures: from 1938, employees had to bring disputes with management initially to their tribal headman (Robotham, 1989) . Then in 1941 the state encouraged miners to form official trade unions. This brought more formal labour controls, e.g. the ID system to track maintenance boys (Crisp, 1984) . The trade union became an intermediary between mining companies and workers, and helped contain resistance within a rudimentary bureaucratic industrial relations structure, as in Zambia (Burawoy, 1985) . This diminished arbitrary 'hire and fire' powers and coercive controls but restricted local trade union officials' activities and shifted power to higher echelons.
Nevertheless, the stability gained from recognising trade unions soon degenerated and miners constantly confronted management and the government (Crisp, 1984) . 1939 to 1956 marked a period of decline for AGC marked by declining gold prices (inflation adjusted) from $US595 per oz. in 1939 to $US220 in 1970. Labour intensification ensued.
The Ashanti employees' union struck in 1945 and 1946 over abolished deferred payments; wages; working hours; more jobs; better machinery; and lower rents and better housing. However, the union lost control of strikes in the late 1940s and mid-1950s as, "workers made the running and the union officials became the reluctant articulators of their grievances" (Crisp, 1984: xvi-xvii) . Silver attributed "the increasing militancy of rank and file mineworkers … [to] the widening gap between these workers and their union; the cooptation of the union by mining capital and the state, thus creating a capital-state-union alliance against the workers; and the increasing necessity for the state to intervene, often in its most repressive form, to put down the insistent revolt of the mineworkers" (ibid, 1978: 67) . The state intervened by getting police to crush the revolt and using tribal headmen to organise unskilled labour against skilled labour, which exacerbated ethnic or occupational divisions (Robotham, 1989) .
Capital shortages during World War II brought some mine closures (Crisp, 1984) .
Some black miners, paid less than their white counterparts, replaced white headmen who had returned home to enlist. This marked the beginning of the enskilling of black miners and the birth of the 'black bossman' (Robotham, 1989) . The all-mines strike action of 1947 prevented management reversing this when white people returned from the war.
Management began to exercise new controls. In 1950, South African consultants began implementing Scientific Management. Robotham (1989: 43) comments; "an entire reorganisation of the managing system now took place starting with the establishment of Planning Department. Time and motion studies soon followed and standard complements for each job were devised and rigidly adhered to". Systematic work routines were established, e.g. standardised stoping and workplace conditions; planned equipment, material usage, and maintenance; and productivity bonuses. AGC used Taylorism continuously, like Zambian mines (Burawoy, 1985) .
It is unclear whether MACS changes accompanied this. The remit to the consultants mentioned budgeting improvements. Company documentats refer fleetingly to budgets during the 1930s and later, but searches of company records at the Guildhall and University of Birmingham libraries could not corroborate this. Moreover, Dumett, (2000: 587) argues that whilst rudimentary management functions evolved continuously from the 1920s it was not until the 1960s (when Lonrho took over AGC) that 'the modern organisational structure of gold mining emerges'. The tentative suggestion is that a crude MACS for management purposes existed, maintained by engineers in the field, to constantly swap cost calculations with head office managers in London. However, possibly due to the uncertainty of mine operations and the simple organisation structure of the mine, no formal MACS to compute costs or for control was apparent. Nevertheless, financial accounting enabled mine managers and head office to communicate, and for London officials to exert some controlat-a-distance.
State Capitalism and Politicised State Capitalism
The 1940s to 1950s saw an upsurge in independence movements. The Trade Union Congress (TUC), which the Ghana mineworkers' union (GMWU) had joined, was instrumental in this struggle (Crisp, 1984) . When the British granted Ghana independence in 1957 strong links between the new political leaders and trade union leaders prevailed.
Dr. Nkrumah's government embarked on state capitalism policies that embraced grandiose socialist planning, direct political interventions, and nationalisation of foreign companies.
The state made massive investments in SOEs and infrastructure, mainly in major cities, to promote industrialisation. Most Ghanaian SOEs operating today are legacies of this policy (Boateng, 1997 (Hilson, 2002: 22) . Ostensibly legalrational structures of accountability within state capitalism became politicised. Dr.
Nkrumah intervened in large SOEs, granting employment to political loyalists, dismissing those not so inclined, and he annexed popular movements (including the TUC) (Silver, 1978 (Taylor, 2006) . Miners enjoyed a relatively stable environment and their living standards rose (Silver, 1978) . Also the state's regulation of industrial relations, trade union recognition, and protection of miners from arbitrary hire and fire changed controls at the point of production at AGC, e.g., floggings, beatings, cuffs about the head and body, and verbal abuse were eradicated. The arbitrary power of colonial bosses (usually white) to control miners' life outside work diminished. The internal state (formal collective bargaining) was strengthened during state capitalism, as Burawoy (1985) (Robotham, 1989) .
Hostilities between management and miners escalated during the NLC and PP governments. When, in the early 1970s, government and management rejected miners' demands for the same severance pay as in nationalised mines and, for the first time, removal of certain managers, the miners went on the rampage. AGC's attempts to control them failed: as Silver observed (1978:73) , "Capital attempted to resist these labour encroachments, but being repeatedly unable to carry out its labour control function, was increasingly forced to turn to the state for overt assistance, in the form first of police, and finally, of the military".
In 1972 In 1972, the government acquired a 55% interest in AGC by decree, i.e. it expropriated 35% of AGC shares and made it a Ghanaian company with its head office in Accra. Lonhro, now a minority shareholder, managed the mine for a fee.
After the partial nationalisation of AGC in 1972 a tug-of-war for control between the state, its trade union and Lonhro ensued. The government used its controlling interest to influence decisions and appoint the deputy-managing director (a Ghanaian mining expert and government representative on AGC's board) but Lonhro's expertise and substantial investment enabled it to appoint the Managing Director. Political turbulence and economic problems affected internal controls. Gold production peaked at 731,000 ounces in 1973 but output declined rapidly over the following decade to 282,000 ounces. Taylor Budgeting was production oriented as the market could absorb any output. Each mine manager ascertained ore reserves: head office then derived each mine's production target. A manager described the system as "crazy". Another noted, "Then somebody sits in Accra and says produce one million ounces of gold, at a particular grade and cost without actually consulting people working at the mine. … If we did not achieve this, the market was disappointed". Mine managers had little control over financial decisions and ambitious production targets: budgets bore little relation to past operations. One commented that:
"When they came out with the figures, you got so frightened because they were usually high. Having done this it is great but you have 'killed' somebody. " Robotham, (1989: 67) observed that; "The structure of authority in the mine was extremely authoritarian, the general principle governing operations being that the essence of management is control."
and "The mines resorted to ineffectual cost-cutting, exercises which were often counterproductive. Equipment was run down and the whole programme of maintenance and tight management control established in the fifties was allowed to fall into abeyance"
(ibid: 52). Politicised state capitalism brought unrealistic physical production targets set centrally that became decoupled from operational decision-making. Cost planning and control became marginal, and an over-reliance on labour-intensive production and cutting labour to save costs proved disastrous as production fell and targets went unmet, partly through growing labour resistance.
Col. Acheampong's military government in 1972 ordered AGC's miners to rejoin the GMWU. Within 2½ years miners' wages increased by 300% (Silver, 1978) Following warnings about a planned strike in December 1977 the government quickly dispatched soldiers to the town. Although this strike never occurred, management realised the difficulty of controlling miners with the GMWU weakened and the internal state destroyed. Silver (1978) summarised the dilemma of management and the military government thus; "Capital needs a union strong enough to be able to control labour, but not so strong as to threaten capital. The military wants the mineworkers sufficiently happy that they do not join the professionals and students in opposing the regime, but fears the inflationary consequences of paying the wages which alone would keep them happy".
Mounting company debts led management to tighten controls over labour to reduce costs (Silver, 1978) but this failed because miners resisted: "68% of the time no work was done … largely due to the labour arriving late for work and closing early" (Silver, 1978: 80) . Theft of gold, long commonplace and institutionalised into miners' culture was rampant -estimated at 25% of output. The appointment of ex-army and police personnel to head security and using informants proved unsuccessful as security personnel collaborated with miners to perpetuate thefts. Management then employed boys aged 12 to 15 to wash gold naked, to prevent them pocketing gold, but thefts continued. Management argued that thefts were immoral but miners claimed it was a reaction to inhumane working conditions -working 7 days a week for low pay (Silver, 1978) . Further measures to halt thefts such as using aggressive supervisors provoked violent responses: miners sabotaged mining equipment, mixed waste with ore, fiddled supervisor's production figures, and even used physical violence. A European supervisor who tried to halt a theft was severely beaten and lost an eye. Consequently, supervisors often ignored thefts (Silver, 1978) .
European supervisors found exerting tight labour controls used in other African mines difficult in Ghanaian mines (including AGC) (Silver, 1978) . Miners often resisted and consequently, "a 'technical' management problem having to do with efficiency and technique, is in reality a struggle over control of the workplace" (Silver 1978: 82) .
Previously management sacked strike leaders instantly but now this might provoke violent clashes, and their attempts to infiltrate the miners and buy some off failed. Silver (1978: 82) illustrated the severity of the problem: "one expatriate manager … reported that he no longer sends the department vehicles to the Transport Department to be serviced, since the Transport Department has become a 'black power shop', effectively taken over by workers who defy management's control, and laugh at their fulminations".
Officially, management controls were as prior to 'nationalisation' but in practice were marked by corruption, ethnicity and personalised relations. Supervisors had problems controlling subordinates with close relationships with higher management (Robotham, 1989 ). Miners complained they had to bribe officials such as the shift bosses for promotion, the medical officer for sick leave, and the welfare officer for accommodation. The economy entered dire straits. During Acheampong's regime export earnings fell by 52% and domestic savings and investment by 12% (World Bank Report, 1995a; Ho Won, 1993 intervention did not materialise (Robotham, 1989: 59) . New mining and investment laws in 1986 let AGC retain 45% of export earnings, which released funds to repay loans and invest, for instance in sixty scrapers. Gold production increased, rising sevenfold from 1987 to 1999, reversing the decline from 1980 to 1986 (see Table 2 ). In 1993, output was 1261,424 oz. and in 1998 exceeded 2 million oz., accounting for 38% of Ghana's exports.
Market Capitalism and Politicised Market Capitalism
AGC's mines accounted for over 50% of production (Hilson, 2002 ) (see Table 2 ). The expansion programme improved financial performance. Operating profits increased from 1991 to 1995, and dividends were paid until the late 1990s (see Table 3 resistance. Controls remained highly disciplinary, especially for unskilled Northern black workers, and their differential application across ethnic groups engendered conflicts that weakened solidarity.
Stealing gold persisted. A manager recalled how, "Some miners went to the extent of swallowing the gold and getting it out when they go to the toilet. Sometimes we had to take suspected miners to the hospital. They would then be forced to go the toilet and the gold retrieved." Introducing metal detectors precipitated a strike. A miner observed that, "Before this time, no one really cares about his salary because once you go underground you are sure you can come out with some gold to sell. There was a ready market for it, so we made so much money. Then, management introduced these metal detectors. We demonstrated that we do not want 'pim pim'" (the sound made by detectors). In hindsight, some interviewees accused employees and management of complacency in the belief that the company's wealth was everlasting. A manager recalled how, "Controls were there on paper but were very often relaxed as money was no problem". However, industrial relations and pay became more prominent as controls tightened and diminished miners' illegal income.
Trade union activities and GMWU influence declined following the sale of Government shares in 1994. Workers recognised their dependence upon international capital and the union became less confrontational. Nevertheless, trade unions were recognised and a strengthened internal state emerged whereby employees' jobs were graded with appropriate pay scales and fringe benefits negotiated periodically through collective bargaining contracts. Management tried to facilitate negotiation, transparency, and cordial relations by co-opting the unions, granting them two board representatives.
Nevertheless, management used covert actions. An industrial relations unit in each mine monitored miners' behaviour and discipline, and reported imminent strikes. Miners viewed industrial relations officers with suspicion, seeing them as spies and controllers.
The miners' union fight for improved conditions after flotation had little success -the final offer of salaries indexed to the US dollar failed to meet their demands. Miners believed that union leaders had 'sold them out', and they voted to remove them. A miner at this meeting recollected that, "It was a hostile environment. Some miners threatened that if the existing leadership is re-elected they will beat them up and burn things in the mine. We all knew that top management is supporting these leaders and we made sure they were booted out of office. Everybody thinks they have betrayed us and about 90% voted for a new leadership." The mistrust between miners and their leaders, and redundancies in 1998 and 1999 in AGC and mining companies elsewhere weakened miners' power.
As Table 2 reveals, gold production declined at the Obuasi mine after the 1994 flotation but was offset by increased production elsewhere to 1603,821 oz. in 2003.
However, as Table 3 Table 4 ) but no dividend was declared due to huge negative company reserves.
Shares that had traded at US$16 on the New York Stock Exchange fell sharply and international stock markets suspended trading for several months in late 1999. The government used its veto powers to scupper a bid of US$665m by Lonmin, which held 32% of AGC's shares. Moreover, Goldman Sachs, the largest hedge fund creditor of AGC, opposed a quick sell-off. In February 2000, AGC arranged interim finance of US$100m
with Barclays Bank until a $326m refinancing package was finalised. This renewed a US$270 m. revolving credit facility and retained hedge protection without potential cash calls for three years.
However, neither gold production nor financial profitability improved (see Tables   2 and 3 Prior to the merger AGC had made a progressive commitment to social corporate reporting (CSR) in an agreement with the Ghanaian government. Subsequently, AngloGold projected an image of a company committed to CSR and corporate governance in their "Code of Business Principles and Ethics" in highly visible areas like health, education and community support but its commitment to high ethical standards has been questioned (Rockson, 2016) , e.g. regarding labour and corporate governance. Allegedly, its utilisation of CSR has been instrumental to gain legitimacy from investors, consumers, government regulators and nongovernmental organizations -indeed Rockson found managers knew little of the CSR commitments. He argues that discrimination in wages, tax evasion or avoidance, and non-disclosures, casts doubts about this multinational's corporate governance credentials, and whether it is a good corporate citizen.
AngloGold adopted retrenchment strategies utilising human resource management practices like "flexible employment" 7 and "double breasting" 8 whose origins stem from SAPs (Rockwell, 2016). The GMWU opposed "contract labour" implemented under a guise of "rationalization of labour". Nevertheless, a supply chain strategy of contracting out services and labour emerged. Rockwell found that the company was increasingly not recruiting workers over long periods, as in the past, but were being employed on a "yearly performance based renewable contract basis" with re-engagement depending on whether they had met managerially set targets. Work has become increasingly precarious and increased employment insecurity and casualization have weakened the trade unions.
After ten years of major losses, with trade union and government agreement, the Obuasi mine was closed for two years for maintenance. Only 700 of the 6,000 workers remain and only contractors who had met management determined targets will be retained.
In 2011 AngloGold Ashanti won the Most Irresponsible Company Award by the Berne
Declaration and Greenpeace in Davos, Switzerland, mainly for its contribution to environmental degradation.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The research examined whether controls in AGC followed the development stages in Figure 1 and the social, economic and political factors in each regime of control in Table   1 Prior to colonialism indigenous gold production under a traditional, feudal MOP occurred. In contrast, from inception, AGC was a private company driven by profits, financed by foreign capital markets, subject to British financial reporting requirements, with a capitalist MOP. Accounting during colonialism was largely for stewardship. Local managers supplied ad hoc reports to the London head office which made financing, dividend, and planning and control decisions. Minimal formal accounting occurred within operations, though engineers constantly estimated and discussed costs with head office.
There was no formal MACS though there was evidence of emergent budgets.
White 'Europeans' dominated management. They exerted personal, physical, direct, and coercive and physical controls over indigenous miners habituated to a rural traditional culture. 9 They recruited workers from different tribes, regions and religions to different positions and exploited ethnic differences to diminish resistance by miners. Being a company state AGC's control extended beyond work. The colonial state offered workers 9 Miners largely come from rural traditional villages and, as some managers alluded, supervision had to be sensitive to their culture, and issues around theft may relate to differing values about property rights. The major study in Hopper et al. (2009) was a study of a textile mill in a rural Sri Lankan village where the traditional culture rendered attempts to impose capitalist MOPs ineffective (Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005) . However, this mill was state-owned for most of the period, loss making, and workers could augment their resistance with support from politicians whereas AGC was privately owned, driven by profit-making, and political support for miners waxed and waned.
little protection: regulation of AGC was minimal and it primarily served AGC's interests by providing infrastructure and when necessary, putting down any resistance. Trade unions were illegal but, as resistance grew during late colonialism the colonial state had recognise trade union activity, which resulted in the company state receding and a rudimentary internal state governing industrial relations emerging.
Like many LDCs upon independence, Ghana adopted state capitalism. However, AGC was never fully nationalised, although other gold mines were. This was attributable to the personal, and possibly dubious relationships of senior AGC managers with political leaders, consistent with neo-patrimonial political regimes. However, the existence of stateowned mines alongside a private mine (albeit partially nationalised for a short period) permits comparative analysis. The state mines were not studied directly but it is widely accepted they descended into politicised state capitalism marked by corruption, patronage, Generally the nationalisation of mines produced politicised state capitalism as described by Hopper et al. (2009) . Given AGS's relative success under private ownership the failure of nationalised mines cannot be simply attributed to economic factors. However, after independence politicians brought greater indigenisation of supervisory and managerial positions, ended harsh physical controls, and brought AGC under Ghanaian company law.
Ghana's economy deteriorated rapidly: in the early 1980s fiscal crises ensued as noted elsewhere by Hopper et al. (2009) . Ghana became one of the most heavily indebted and lowest per capita-income countries in the world. The government had to turn to the WB, IMF and commercial banks for assistance, which heralded in policies based on market capitalism. Ghana had to adopt SAPs that, inter alia, demanded widespread privatisations.
AGC benefitted from loans for greater mechanisation.
In 1994 AGCs' shares were floated on international markets with the government retaining a minority holding. This marked the beginning of AGC becoming a multinational. AGC's mines became profit centres within a divisionalised structure controlled by budgets augmented by decentralised management accountants responsible to line managers. As noted elsewhere, e.g. Hopper and Uddin (2005) , privatisation brought improved MACSs and tighter cost control, which fell especially on mineworkers. The decentralisation of management accountants made responsible to production units increased cost consciousness amongst most but not all managers who were aware of weak market prices and more difficult geological mining conditions. Miners were less convinced but resistance was muted as retrenchments, increased job insecurity and ethnic divisions had weakened their union. Wages and conditions of employment were now governed by triennial collective bargaining and though unions had board representatives many miners believed the company had co-opted the union. However, especially when profits declined, work intensification increased alongside relatively unsuccessful attempts to reduce thefts that had become a norm amongst miners. Whether this is attributable to non-capitalist cultural beliefs about property rights, a reaction to perceived exploitation, or just simple larcency, or a combination of all, is debatable.
When gold prices sharply declined and hedging strategies failed, AGC made acute international capital dominates labour, now rendered precarious within segmented labour markets and subcontracting, and reinforced by reduced empoyment opportunities due to deterioriating mining conditions and mechanisation. This could be seen as a return to subcontracting noted by Hopper and Armstrong (1991) in the USA in the nineteenth century. However, this was adopted due to owners' ignorance of operations and the power of craft labour. In AngloGold labour was now weak, managerial understanding of production strong, and accounting controls measuring employees' relative productivity and pricing facilitated the rendering of work as precarious. This more recent turn of managerial strategies of control under market capitalism is not covered in the Hopper et al. (2009) framework.
However, although Ghana's governments, now democratic, are prone to corruption and neo-patrimonialism little evidence was found of their collusion, unlike the cases in Hopper et al. (2009) , especially Wickramasinghe et al (2004) in Sri Lanka and Uddin and Hopper (2001) in Bangladesh. Rather, weakened trade unions and a government dependent upon, and worried about discouraging foreign direct investment had an inequitable power relation with foreign capital, which resulted in weak regulation to the detriment of CSR concerns (Rockson, 2016) .
As Dumett (1985) suggests, 10 the evolution of controls at AGC is consistent with Chandler's (1975) Privatisations -varied results Profit criteria not congruent with development aims New avenues of politic control, e.g. regulation 
